Why does a date from more than a century ago continue to teach us something even today? It is said that on 31 January 1865 the United States Congress ratified the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery. This date is often remembered as a decisive moment in American history, almost as if it marked a clear break with the past. However, it is more precisely a case of documented history rather than history “as lived.” It was the culmination of years of political rupture, social imbalances, the collapse of order during the Civil War, and the wars that followed. The legal end of slavery did not automatically mean the end of discrimination and inequality; therefore, this symbolic date should mark not only a moment of historical relevance, but also a banner of ongoing struggles and achievements, now more than ever. More than a century later, can we truly say that slavery has been eliminated? If we consider the term in a strict sense, we can say that slavery, as it manifested itself throughout history, no longer exists; nevertheless, if we consider the term in a broader sense, it can be observed that today more than ever the idea of “being slaves to one’s own work” is widespread. In contemporary society, careers and professional paths have taken precedence over private life to such an extent that people become slaves to their work: one lives to work rather than working to live. From a legal perspective, the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century established the principle according to which no human being can be considered the property of another. And although in contemporary society new forms of subjugation undoubtedly emerge - such as those linked to work, which can certainly limit individual freedom - it is nevertheless possible to state that, “in a strict sense,” slavery had at that moment been abolished. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution formalizes this idea in the United States, prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude, “except as a punishment for crime.” Similar abolitionist processes developed in the same years in Europe and in other colonial territories. Despite this, the cessation of the legal condition of slavery did not lead to the definitive extinction of all forms of labor coercion. Abolition was followed by the introduction of labor regimes in many colonial contexts. For this reason, although officially distinct from slavery, these regimes continued to severely limit the personal freedom of workers. From a legal point of view, it is necessary to distinguish between forced labor - coercive action - and slavery, considered rather as a legitimate institution. While slavery implies the legal ownership of a person, forced labor can exist even in the absence of such ownership, through the imposition of labor obligations supported by legal sanctions or conditions of economic dependency (“The Legal Understanding of Slavery: From the Historical to the Contemporary,” Allain, 2012). There was no system of labor rights prior to the abolition of slavery in British, French, and Belgian colonial territories. Personal freedom was not accompanied by concrete guarantees such as freedom of movement, the possibility of terminating a contract, or access to judicial protection. In the absence of such means, colonial authorities developed new regulatory tools to maintain agricultural production. For example, indigenous labor codes in West and Central Africa imposed labor obligations on local residents. An emblematic case is that of the French Code de l’Indigénat, applied from the end of the nineteenth century, which allowed the imposition of compulsory labor and administrative sanctions without full judicial oversight (“Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa,” Cooper, 1996). Similarly, monetary taxation policies were adopted in British East Africa, such as the hut tax, forcing local populations to work on plantations or colonial construction sites in order to obtain the money necessary to pay taxes. Although the work was formally paid, fiscal coercion drastically limited freedom of choice (“Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism,” Mamdani, 1996). Moreover, a key legal element in these systems was contractual consent. Labor contracts on colonial plantations were often long and difficult to terminate. Failure to comply could lead to criminal sanctions, transforming a civil obligation into a true form of legal coercion. However, consent is flawed in these circumstances, as it undeniably derives from a situation of financial urgency and threat of punishment. Not only the rules, but also the institutions were similar to the slaveholding past. Colonial administrative and judicial structures, in many cases, remained unchanged after abolition, applying new laws with the same objective of controlling the labor force. As Frederick Cooper observes in Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (2005), abolition produced a formal restructuring of labor law, but without a real redistribution of power. Only from the twentieth century onward did international law begin to adopt stricter measures regarding forced labor. A turning point was the adoption of ILO Convention No. 29 on Forced Labour (1930), which defined the practice as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” Although it appeared legally acceptable at the time, this definition makes it possible to classify many colonial practices after abolition within the meaning of forced labor. African colonial plantations between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century thus show how forced labor continued even after the abolition of slavery. Agricultural production in these areas required a stable and low-cost workforce, a practice formally eliminated with the abolition of slavery. The forced collection of rubber and the system of agricultural concessions in the Belgian Congo, for example, compelled local residents to work. Although slavery was officially prohibited, failure to meet production quotas could result in severe punishments, including corporal sanctions and detention (King Leopold’s Ghost, Hochschild, 1998). From a legal standpoint, the labor was not officially an expression of slavery, but the coercion exercised by colonial authorities compromised its voluntary nature. In French West Africa, compulsory labor on plantations and public infrastructure was regulated through administrative decrees imposing annual periods of work on local residents. These obligations were justified as civic duties, but in fact constituted a systematic limitation of personal freedom (“Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa,” Cooper, 1996). African workers were also forced into plantations in the British Empire—in countries such as Kenya and Uganda—through a combination of taxation, coercive contracts, and restrictions on mobility. Formally free labor became the only available solution when there were no economic alternatives. From a legal perspective, these systems highlight a divide between formal legality and substantive freedom. Although the colonial laws in force permitted labor, they were not consistent with the principles that had led to the end of slavery already in the nineteenth century. Coercion was no longer based on personal ownership, but on a set of fiscal, penal, and contractual obligations. The analysis of these cases, in relation to modern international conventions, clearly shows how many colonial practices following abolition remain connected to the concept of forced labor. This does not mean that such practices should be judged solely with hindsight, but rather that they should be evaluated legally in light of current standards of international law.